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REFLECTIONS ON APPELLATE 
LEADERSHIP 
Rt Hon Dame Sian Elias* 
My theme is appellate leadership.  I do not mean by that the administrative chores of 
listings and workflow, which the President of a busy court cannot decently avoid.  I mean, 
rather, the intellectual leadership of a court, which must have the confidence of the 
community.   
Sir Ivor Richardson's twenty-five years of appellate service might be thought sufficient 
in length alone to justify some such reflection.  More importantly, however, that service 
has been marked by frank explanations in both judgments and extra-judicial writing of his 
views of judicial method and function, and their limits.   
Richard Posner has suggested that "[Judges] rarely level with the public – and not 
always with themselves – concerning the seamier side of the judicial process".  He says: 
"This is the side that includes the unprincipled compromises and petty jealousies and 
rivalries that accompany collegial decision-making, [and] the indolence and apathy that 
life tenure can induce".1 
Although he has been a fixed star in the judicial firmament for so long that it may seem 
that Sir Ivor Richardson has had life tenure, no one could accuse him of indolence and 
apathy.  Nor indeed, has it ever been suggested that he has ever compromised in an 
unprincipled way.  But candour about judicial process is rare.  And Sir Ivor's openness 
throughout his judicial service is itself an invitation to think a little about the choices that 
appellate decision-making throws up. 
Sir Ivor's openness I think stems from his clear conviction that "the courts are the 
people's courts",2 and that judicial authority is not its own vindication but is a trust 
discharged only by scrupulous justification through public reasons.  It suggests a vision of 
  
*  Chief Justice of New Zealand. 
1 Richard Posner The Problems of Jurisprudence (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, (Mass), 1990) 
190. 
2  Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson "The Courts and the Public" (1995) NZLJ 11, 13. 
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the role of the appellate Judge that is restrained and deferential to the democratic process 
and good government.  
These impulses do not spring from the preferences of a black-letter lawyer, isolated 
from the community.  They are grounded in an appreciation of New Zealand society 
gained from engagement in it in many different capacities before and after appointment to 
the bench.3  Sir Ivor Richardson's experiences, particularly in public administration and 
social policy, may have given him an acute appreciation of the complexities of policy 
choices.   
Renquist CJ adopts Lewis Powell's description of the Supreme Court of the United 
States as an institution "greater than the sum of its parts".  I am not sure that I agree with 
that description of any court.  Indeed, Renquist seems to be describing a court that is less 
than the sum of its parts when, perhaps unconsciously echoing Posner, he says:4 
There must be an effort to get an opinion for at least a majority of the Court in every case 
where that is possible, in order that lower court Judges and the profession as a whole may 
know what the law is without having to go through an elaborate head-counting process.  To 
accomplish this, some give and take is inevitable, and doctrinal purity may be muddied in the 
process …  
… an appellate Judge's primary task is to function as a member of a collegial body which must 
decide important questions of federal law in a way that gives intelligible guidance to the bench 
and bar.  Memorable opinions are the by-product of that process, not an end in themselves. 
I know that Sir Ivor Richardson during his term as President has placed great emphasis 
on the collegiate work of the permanent Court of Appeal.  It has been one of the reasons 
why he has been reluctant to see the numbers of Judges of the Court increased,5 and it has 
been a reason for sitting regularly in courts of five.  His success in leading the Court should 
not, however, be judged by measures such as the number of individual judgments written.  
  
3  For example, Sir Ivor was Chairman of the Committee of Inquiry into Inflation Accounting (1975-
6), Chairman of the Royal Commission on Social Policy (1987-88), and conducted a review of the 
Inland Revenue Department (1993-4).  Writing extra-judicially, Sir Ivor has expressed the view 
that it is not inconsistent with judicial office for a Judge to serve in a governmental capacity "if the 
reason for his appointment is the need to harness to the task in question the special skills which 
the Judge should possess – characteristically, the ability to dissect and analyse evidence, appraise 
witnesses, exercise a fair and balanced judgment, write a clear and coherent report, and so on". (Rt 
Hon Sir Ivor Richardson "Comment on 'Why be a Judge?' by Brennan CJ" (Papers of the New 
Zealand High Court and Court of Appeal Judges' Conference, Dunedin, 1996). 
4 William H Renquist "Remarks on the Process of Judging" (1992) 49 Washington and Lee L Rev 
263, 270. 
5  Rt Hon Mr Justice Richardson "The Role of an Appellate Judge" (1981) 5 Otago LR 1, 5. 
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The fact of the matter is that important cases are hard and inevitably provoke divergence 
in view.  And that is how it should be. 
I am reminded of Felix Frankfurter's derision about the high hopes that were held for 
the appointment of Taft as Chief Justice to a very divided Supreme Court.  Editorials were 
written predicting that because Taft was such a charming man, such divisions would 
evaporate.  Frankfurter said to the University of Virginia law students of 1953:6 
I really think that's very funny.  The assumption of this serious editorial writer that Taft, C J, 
would just smile and then Holmes would say, "Aye, aye, sir," or Justice Van Devanter would 
say, "For ten years I've been disagreeing with Holmes, but now that you've smiled at both of 
us, why we just love each other" ... [M]y impression is strong that a count would show more 
five-to-four decisions during Taft's time than during White's time; or certainly just as many.  
Life was pleasant, very pleasant, with Taft as Chief Justice, but judicial conflicts existed 
because the problems before the Court evoked them … the sparks even carried outside of the 
conference room to singe the pages of the United States Reports … What Judge worth his salt 
would have his convictions influenced by whether the Chief Justice is a charming man and a 
delightful raconteur, or not?  That isn't the nature of the problems to be faced.  That isn't the 
nature of the function.  That isn't the nature of the enterprise. 
Well, as a part timer, may I report that life has been pleasant, very pleasant, with Sir 
Ivor Richardson as President of the Court of Appeal.  There has been no pressure to 
compromise quality for the sake of bench or bar and no muddying of doctrinal purity.  
Memorable judgments have been written, a very large number by the President.  And if 
many others bear his unmistakable influence, well true appellate leadership comes not 
from brokering compromises but from intellectual example in judging.   
What makes a good Judge?  Felix Frankfurter at the same Virginia Law School chat 
mused that public misconceptions about judicial function are illustrated by 'the question 
you hear so often: "Does a man become any different when he puts on a gown?"  His 
answer, he said, was "If he's any good, he does".7  As Frankfurter suggests, the question 
misunderstands the proper role of the Judge.  Those who are sworn to do right according 
to law do not exercise personal power according to personal preference.  Of course, Judges 
bring their own experiences to bear when they come to judgment.  And, as Brennan CJ 
once acknowledged, it is "sometimes difficult to be sure where the wisdom of human 
experience ends and prejudice begins".8  But the ability to discover and suppress prejudice 
  
6 Felix Frankfurter "Chief Justices I Have Known" (1953) 39 Virginia L Rev 883, 900. 
7  Frankfurter, above, 901. 
8 Hon Sir Gerald Brennan "Why be a Judge?" (Paper presented at the New Zealand High Court and 
Court of Appeal Judges' Conference, Dunedin, 1996) 9. 
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is a professional responsibility of the Judge.  And its demonstration in actual cases requires 
the provision of reasons for judgment.  Reasons are necessary to demonstrate that the case 
has been decided in accordance with valid legal rules or principles and not to fit the 
personal beliefs of the Judge.  Reasons are "essential to the common law judicial method".9 
The legitimacy of judicial function in our system is founded upon the fact that the 
Judge operates in public and must give reasons for decision.  These obligations are the best 
check against arbitrariness or illegitimacy, as Sir Ivor Richardson has frequently 
acknowledged.  In 1981, speaking extra-judicially, he described the duty to give adequate 
reasons as a protection to all and "part and parcel" of the open administration of justice:10 
Judgments are addressed not only to the parties, who are primarily concerned in the result and 
the immediate reasoning leading to it, but also the wider public who may be as concerned 
with the implications of the reasoning for the future as they are in the result of the particular 
case.  Clearly judgments should not be arabesques.  They should disclose exactly how the 
Judge decided the case the way he did.  So that his reasoning as well as the end decision are 
open to comment and criticism.  The focus is then, as it should be, on the reasons for the 
decision, rather than on the exercise of judicial authority. 
Reasons serve three main ends.  They demonstrate to the parties that they have been 
heard.  They enable accountability, through the appellate process or through public 
criticism.  And they promote certainty and consistency by enabling like cases to be decided 
alike.11  All three of these ends are important to the common law tradition.  Justice 
between the parties to the particular dispute is only part of the picture.  It is an inadequate 
view of courts that they are publicly funded dispute resolution services.12  The answer to 
the question posed in this session by Justice Gault ("Whose Day in Court is it Anyway?") is 
that a day in Court is not capable of ownership except by the community as a whole.  To 
view litigants as "consumers" and "purchasers" of services is misleading.  The service of the 
courts is due to the community.  Where one dispute has been publicly determined, others 
similarly placed will not need to litigate.  Court decisions are therefore a benefit available 
to all, not simply to those who participate through litigation.  Courts are the means by 
which right according to law is done in society.  That is a core function of government.  
The authoritative ascertainment of what the law is and the encouragement of consistent 
and proper conduct by public process are substantial public benefits. 
  
9  Hon Justice Michael McHugh AC "The Judicial Method" (1999) 73 Aust LJ 37, 37. 
10  Sir Ivor Richardson "The Role of an Appellate Judge" (1981) 5 OULR 1, 7.   
11 McHugh, above. 
12  See Hon James Spigelman "Seen to be Done:  The Principle of Open Justice" (2000) 74 Aust LJ 290. 
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The fact that courts are an important function of government has implications for 
questions of access, court organisation, and judicial method.  Elsewhere, I have expressed 
some doubts as to whether recent initiatives, some of them Judge-led, to cover or reduce 
costs and improve efficiency in the dispatch of court business have always sufficiently 
considered this context.13  It is a theme developed in Australia by Spigelman CJ with some 
warmth.14  I do not suggest that better standards of court management are to be resisted.  
The community is entitled to value for the money it puts into courts.  We cannot go on 
increasing the number of Judges and courtrooms without depriving other important social 
institutions of resources.  The challenge is to strike the appropriate balance between 
efficiency in dispatch of court business and ensuring that justice is not prejudiced.   
Such balancing between efficiency and justice has exercised the President in the 
administration of the heavy workload of the Court of Appeal.  It has led to changed 
practices in the Court, with greater reliance on written material, considered by the Judges 
in advance of the hearing.  It has led to on the papers consideration of some criminal 
appeals, now authorised by the Crimes (Criminal Appeal) Amendment Act 2001.  It has 
led to a preference (not inflexible) for avoidance of multiple judgments.  It has led to the 
suggestions aired by Justice Gault in his paper (and foreshadowed in other jurisdictions) of 
further screening through leave provisions,15 time limits for oral argument, and skeleton 
or memorandum judgments. As the decision in Taito16 indicates, it is not always easy to 
maintain the balance between desirable efficiencies and competing interests of justice.  
There is a risk of throwing the baby out with the bath water.  Litigation through courts is 
not time efficient nor cost efficient.  It is however fair, open, subject to the discipline of 
reasons, and subject to correction for error through appeal or review.  These are 
considerable virtues. 
Sir Ivor Richardson's judging has been characterised by a scrupulousness which is 
dismissive of "flamboyant rhetoric and evangelical fervour".17  Fidelity to the principles, 
values, and limits of adjudication are hallmarks of his judgments.   
  
13  Rt Hon Dame Sian Elias "Discounting Justice" (Speech to the Legal Research Foundation Annual 
General Meeting, Wellington, 25 October 2001). 
14  Spigelman, above; James Spigelman CJ "The 'New Public Management' and the Courts" (Speech to 
to the Family Courts of Australia, 25th Anniversary Conference, Sydney, 27 July 2001). 
15  A solution foreshadowed as preferable to expansion of the numbers of the Court of Appeal and 
erosion of the "collegiate character and possibly the public standing of the Court" by Sir Ivor 
Richardson in "The Role of an Appellate Judge" (1981) 5 OULR 1, 5. 
16  Taito v R Bennet & Ors v R (19 March 2002) Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, PC 50 and 59 
of 2001. 
17  Richardson, above, 10. 
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Judges do not approach decisions in a vacuum.  They have the context of statutes, 
regulations, precedents, scholarly writing, history, and shared community values.  Where 
there is no settled law, or where the conditions have altered so that a former legal rule 
requires reconsideration, the Judge must call on wider considerations.  Principle and 
analogy are the preferred judicial tools.  Not for the sake of an arid symmetry.  But to 
enable comparable experience and standards to be applied in responding to real life issues.  
No judgment is isolated from the existing order.  A Judge is always faced with the need to 
fit the decision into the existing fabric, both in achieving a just solution for the parties and 
to maintain the balance for future cases.  That is why superficial and "romantic" 
assessments of Judges as "conservative" or "activist" are so astray.  The fact is that the 
intellectual differences to which these labels are attached are severely cramped by legal 
context and method.  If it is to convince, a decision must be principled and coherent and in 
accordance with what Brennan J called "the skeleton of principle which gives the body of 
our law its shape and internal consistency".18 
Where the law is unsettled, judicial development in interpretation of statutes and in 
extension of the common law cannot be avoided.  In that task, the Judge cannot escape 
consideration of the policies that the statute or the common law serves.  And such 
consideration requires a register.  Sir Ivor Richardson is explicit: "What is important, of 
course, is that the Judge should have a philosophy of life, a framework of reference against 
which to probe and test the economic, social and political questions involved".19 
Such framework is not however a personal one.  The search for context begins with 
legislation.  One of Sir Ivor Richardson's main contributions to the development of New 
Zealand law has been his attention to the centrality of statutes and his insistence on careful 
consideration of their scheme and purpose.  An example is the attention paid to the three 
statutes relevant to the rating decision in Wellington City Council v Woolworths New Zealand 
Limited (No 2).20 
In Quilter v Attorney-General,21 the Marriage Act 1955 was found by Richardson P to be: 
"So clear that to rely on particular perspectives on human rights and social policy values to 
accommodate same-sex marriages would require fresh legislation, which is the function of 
Parliament"22 
  
18  Dietrich v The Queen (1992) 109 ALR 385, 403 (HCA) Brennan J, quoting himself in Mabo v 
Queensland (1992) 107 ALR 1, 18 (HCA). 
19  Richardson, above, 9. 
20 Wellington City Council v Woolworths New Zealand Limited (No 2) [1996] 2 NZLR 537 (CA). 
21  Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] 1 NZLR 523 (CA). 
22  Quilter, above, 531 (CA) Richardson P. 
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Where legislative guidance as to the frame of reference does not provide an answer, 
however, the Judge is forced to the values inherent in the common law and, beyond them, 
to the contemporary social values with which the common law must be consonant if it is to 
have legitimacy.  In the cases which have come before the Court of Appeal in the last ten 
years where reconsideration of precedent has been necessary, Sir Ivor has not shrunk from 
the duty to keep the law up to date both in exposition of the rules of the common law and 
in the balancing of values required by contemporary legislation.23  But in departing from 
precedent, it is fair to say that the President is cautious.  The caution derives first from the 
consciousness that adherence to past decisions promotes certainty and stability:  "People 
need to know where they stand, what the law expects of them":24 
And a Court which freely reviews its earlier decisions is likely to find not only that the Court 
lists are jammed by litigants seeking to find a chance majority for change, but also that the 
respect for the law on which our system of justice largely depends is eroded. 
Whether the courts should depart from precedent is influenced by the subject-matter of 
the case and whether the courts have undertaken responsibility for it.  Thus, in R v Hines25 
Richardson P considered that it was relevant that the case involved fair trial, a subject with 
which the courts have close experience.  In Dahya v Dahya26 Richardson J considered it 
significant that the legislation there in issue, the Matrimonial Property Act 1976, was 
"designed to meet conditions and values in our society".27  The Court had a responsibility 
to fulfil that purpose in its application of the Act.  In Invercargill City Council v Hamlin 
Richardson J was concerned that: "[l]egislation must be seen in its social setting and the 
common law of New Zealand should reflect the kind of society we are and meet the needs 
of our society".28 
In Slater v Slater Richardson J recognised that:29 
[b]ecause of its central role in our society, family law is inevitably influenced by changes in 
social attitudes and values. 
  
23  See, for example, Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1994] 3 NZLR 513 (CA). 
24 Collector of Customs v Lawrence Publishing Co Ltd [1986] 1 NZLR 404, 414 (CA) Richardson J. 
25  R v Hines [1997] 3 NZLR 529, 538 (CA) Richardson P. 
26  Dahya v Dahya [1991] 2 NZLR 150 (CA). 
27 Also see Slater v Slater [1983] NZLR 166 (CA). 
28  Invercargill City Council v Hamlin [1994] 3 NZLR 513, 524 (CA) Richardson J. 
29  Slater, above, 173, Richardson J. 
1072 (2002) 33 VUWLR 
In Attorney-General v Prince,30 Richardson P reviewed the Adoption Act 1955, 
examining its social setting in 1969 and the changes in the social attitudes since.  The 
values the court has a responsibility to apply are not the personal values of the Judge.  
They were identified by the President in R v Hines31 as "community values" which are 
relatively permanent, not transient.32 
In identifying such values, Sir Ivor has expressed some misgivings. Thus although he 
recognises that just content is critical to the rule of law,33 he is skeptical of the extent to 
which the provision of just law is properly the legitimate role of the Judge.  Values shift 
over time, sometimes rapidly.  And they are pitched at a level of abstraction that often 
entails conflict with other values.  Where competing values must be weighed in 
application of law, "constant fine tuning" is necessary.34  The problem is acute in cases 
which require the adjustment of rights and values under the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 (a matter I deal with further below) but it also arises whenever policy choices 
must be made under legislation or common law.  When the Judge is required to identify 
and consider enduring community values, Sir Ivor is alive to the risk that his or her 
personal experiences will skew the perspective.  He has referred in his own writing35 to 
the example given by Lord Devlin of Judges who have obstructed statutes because of 
personal hostility to their aims:36 
 
They looked for the philosophy behind the Act and what they found was a Victorian Bill of 
Rights, favouring (subject to the observance of the accepted standards of morality) the liberty 
of the individual, the freedom of contract, and the sacredness of property, and which was 
highly suspicious of taxation.  If the Act interfered with these notions, the Judges tended either 
 
30  Attorney-General v Prince [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA). 
31  R v Hines [1997] 3 NZLR 529, 538 (CA) Richardson P. 
32  For an application of the approach taken in the dissenting judgment, see Brennan J in Dietrich v 
The Queen (1992) 109 ALR 385 (HCA) Brennan J. 
33 Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson "Comment on 'Why be a Judge?' by Brennan CJ" (Papers of the New 
Zealand High Court and Court of Appeal Judges' Conference, Dunedin, 1996) where he said 
"There are two relevant aspects to the rule of law, both of which are crucial for the maintenance of 
peace and order in society.  The first, and the point usually concentrated on in discussion, is that 
disputes are resolved according to a priori and settled rules of conduct.  The second and equally 
important is that to achieve peace and order the government must provide laws that broadly speaking tend 
to diminish injustice" [emphasis added]. 
34  Rt Hon Mr Justice Richardson "The Role of an Appellate Judge" (1981) 5 OULR 1, 12. 
35  Richardson, 1996 Judges' Conference, above. 
36  Richardson, 1996 Judges' Conference, above, quoting Lord Devlin "Judges and Lawmakers" (1976) 
39 MLR 115. 
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to assume that it could not mean what it said or to minimize the interference by giving the 
intrusive words the narrowest possible construction, even to the point of pedantry. 
In addition to the concern that Judges may not be well placed to identify community 
values, it has been a consistent theme in Sir Ivor Richardson's work on and off the bench 
that some questions are not suitable for judicial resolution:37 
Judges must be conscious of the respective roles of the three branches of government reflected 
in the Constitution Act 1986:  Parliament, the Executive and the Courts.  The larger the public 
policy context, the less well equipped the Courts are to weigh the considerations involved and 
to attempt to resolve any moral quandaries and the less inclined they must be to intervene.  
That is particularly so where there are public policy ramifications affecting the bases of other 
relevant common law or statutory provisions.  In short, where the consequences reach beyond 
the limits of the case and beyond a particular response to a particular issue. 
In part, this scruple follows from the limitations of an adversary system. Sir Ivor does 
not subscribe to the view that the role of the Judge is simply to decide fairly on the 
arguments and authorities put up by the parties38 (a "limited conception" of function 
which Sir Frank Kitto described as appropriate for the Judge of a debating society but not a 
Judge with a duty to decide according to law).39  But his judgments and writings indicate a 
firm view that the limitations of the adversary process set limits to the findings of 
"legislative facts" without which the implications for shifts in law cannot adequately be 
addressed.  They also underscore a deep conviction, expressed in the passage from Hines I 
have quoted, that there is no mandate for judicial decisions that encroach upon legislative 
or executive prerogative.40  Sir Ivor's writings suggest that his scruples here are not 
entirely based on legal balances, nor even entirely on democratic principle, but stem in 
part from a less suspicious, more appreciative, understanding of the role of the executive 
in securing good government.41  The boundaries are not rigid.  Sir Ivor acknowledges that 
the commitments in our constitutional arrangements to representative democracy and 
responsible government do not themselves provide the "touchstone of justiciability":42 
  
37 R v Hines [1997] 3 NZLR 529, 539 (CA) Richardson P. 
38  Richardson, "Role of an Appellate Judge", above, 8. 
39  Rt Hon Sir Frank Kitto "Why Write Judgments" (1992) 66 Aust LJ 787. 
40  See CREEDNZ v Governor-General [1981] 1 NZLR 172, 197-198 (CA) Richardson J and Hawkins v 
Minister of Justice [1991] 2 NZLR 530, 536 (CA) Richardson J. 
41  See his approach in Ashby v Minister of Immigration [1981] 1 NZLR 222 (CA) and in Petrocorp 
Exploration Ltd v Minister of Energy [1991] 1 NZLR 1 (CA). 
42  Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson "Public Interest Litigation" (1995) 3 Waik LR 1 [the Harkness Henry 
Lecture of 1995]. 
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They do not define a no-go area for the courts.  The legal answer may be affected by the 
Judge's perspective of the role of the State and of each branch of government.  It may also be 
affected by the Judge's perspective of the balance in the particular society and at the particular 
time between individual, group and community rights, responsibilities and interests. 
Policy issues do not arise only in public law cases.  One of the President's major 
contributions to the development of the common law in New Zealand has been his 
appreciation of the public interest in private litigation.43  It has led to a willingness to 
adopt innovations in legal methodology: the willingness to appoint an amicus curial or 
admit an intervenor so that aspects of the public interest are represented (as in Gazley v 
Attorney-General,44 and Z v Z45); the use of statistical and other empirical information 
where available (as in Invercargill City Council v Hamlin, R v Accused)46 the calls for counsel 
to prepare Brandeis briefs in suitable cases,47 and the use of economic analysis.48  
Although regretting the absence of law and economics analysis in argument in the Court of 
Appeal to enable policy alternatives to be confronted in a systematic and informed way,49 
Sir Ivor has acknowledged the considerable cost in its presentation.50  He also accepts that 
"[e]fficiency concerns are only one factor in an assessment of the public interest" and that 
community values and issues of fairness must also be taken into account.51  A substantial 
contribution by the President to assessment of policy is his reminder that economic 
efficiency is a substantial public benefit, not to be overlooked in intuitive generalisations 
about the public interest and fairness. 
The Richardson approach does not doubt a judicial obligation to ensure that the law is 
consistent with community values.  He has referred frequently to the need for Judges to 
accept the responsibility to keep law in step with changing social needs.  Legal principles 
"need to be continually reassessed, modified, and in some cases replaced, to reflect 
  
43  A theme developed in his Harkness Henry Lecture of 1995, above. 
44  Gazley v Attorney-General (1996) 10 PRNZ 47 (CA). 
45  Z v Z [1997] 2 NZLR 258 (CA). 
46  Invercargill City Council v Hamlin, R v Accused [1994] 3 NZLR 157 (CA). 
47  See, Sir Ivor Richardson "Role of Apellate Judges" (1981) 5 OULR 1, and Rt Hon Sir Ivor 
Richardson "Public Interest Litigation" (1995) 3 Waik LR 1 [the Harkness Henry Lecture of 1995]. 
48  See Sir Ivor Richardson "Lawyers and Economic Consequences" in New Zealand Law Society 
Conference Papers (New Zealand Law Society, Wellington, 1993) Vol 1, 351. 
49 See, for example Williams v Attorney-General [1990] 1 NZLR 646, 681 (CA) Richardson J. 
50  Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson "Law and Economics" (1998) 4 New Zealand Business Law Quarterly 
64, 70. 
51  New Zealand Law Society Conference Papers, above, 358. 
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contemporary thinking".52  His method is, however, sceptical and restrained rather than 
certain and evangelical.  It is respectful of legislative and executive function and conscious 
of judicial limitation. 
Such caution is particularly evident in cases based upon the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990.  The President has been concerned that the Act be understood in its "historical, 
social and legal context in New Zealand".53  This approach is sceptical about comparisons 
with human rights case from other jurisdictions.  It questions whether the "individualistic 
Lockian view reflected in the international conventions of the 1950s would be adopted in 
those terms by the international community today" and whether such a view reflects Maori 
perceptions and the aspirations of other minority community groups.54 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act requires New Zealand Judges to make value 
judgments that have considerable consequences.  These are the choices described for 
another jurisdiction by Professor Laurence Tribe as involving "fundamental choices of 
principle, not … instrumental calculations of utility or … pseudo-scientific calibrations of 
social cost against social benefit".55  I do not imagine that Sir Ivor would agree that 
calculations of utility and calibrations of social cost against social benefit have little part in 
the assessment of human rights violations.  He has stressed that the rights affirmed in the 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act are not absolute.  They must always be adjusted by duties 
to other individuals and to the community.56 
In an important article in 1995, Sir Ivor wrote:57 
[R]ights jurisprudence is often seen as the passport to justice for all.  So much so that to 
question the prevailing philosophy, to put limits on rights and their protection through the 
courts, is easily represented as an attack on liberal values.  But there are other valid interests 
and values which should be taken into account.  Taking those other interests and values into 
account does not mean that individual freedom is trampled.  Rather it recognises the 
complexity of interest claims in a modern ordered society. 
  
52  Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson "Changing Needs for Judicial Decision-making". (1991-1992) Journal 
of Judicial Administration 61, 64, and see Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson "Judges as Lawmakers in the 
1990s" (1986) 12 Monash LR 35, 44. 
53 R v Jefferies [1994] 1 NZLR 290, 299 (CA) Richardson J. 
54  Rt Hon Sir Ivor Richardson "Comment on 'Why be a Judge?' by Brennan CJ" (Papers of the New 
Zealand High Court and Court of Appeal Judges' Conference, Dunedin, 1996). 
55  Laurence Tribe Constitutional Choices (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1985) viii. 
56  R v Jefferies, above, 302-3. 
57  Sir Ivor Richardson "Rights Jurisprudence – Justice for All?" in Phillip Joseph (ed) Essays on the 
Constitution (Brookers, Wellington, 1995) 61. 
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In the same article, Sir Ivor expresses concern that the shift required by the Bill of 
Rights Act may tilt the playing field against authority and risk other public interest values 
if a prima facie exclusion rule is applied to evidence linked in any way to a breach.  R v 
Shaheed58 may be thought to answer that concern convincingly.  But the need to provide 
the court with relevant economic and social material in rights cases represents a continuing 
challenge:59 
Section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act requires a utilitarian assessment of the public 
welfare in determining whether setting reasonable limits on a protected right is justified.  On 
its face that involves a Brandeis brief inquiry where the Court undertakes an extensive 
empirical examination supported by economic, statistical, and sociological data, makes a cost-
benefit analysis of the effects of various policy choices and chooses the solution which best 
reflects a balancing of the values involved. 
The conclusion to the article also gives some insight into the Richardson preference for 
restraint and recognition of the limits of law:60 
Finally, concentration on rights has a pervasive influence on relationships.  Unless balanced by 
an acceptance of civic responsibilities, it encourages confrontation and the adjudication of 
disputes.  It de-emphasises the role of egalitarian and community values and the need for an 
accommodation of interests.  While it allows for the ex post facto monitoring of civil liberties, it 
cannot create the conditions that make a Bill of Rights workable.  That must depend on the 
character and attitudes of the people and on the integrity of their governmental processes. 
The reflections I have touched upon are those of a highly principled and disciplined 
Judge.  They are supported by significant scholarship, relentless attention to method, and 
the imagination without which appellate work would be barren.  They are animated by a 
vision of a New Zealand legal system that is our own, not in any petty triumphalist way, 
but because it is responsive to New Zealand conditions and values. 
We have cause to be grateful for such fidelity to the principles of adjudication: the 
recognition that judicial determinations must be legitimate and that courts cannot have 
agendas; the understanding that the Judges are not law reform commissioners and lack the 
methods and the mandate to solve every social or economic problem; and the fixed 
allegiance to the effort of judgment. 
  
58  R v Shaheed (28 March 2002) Court of Appeal, Wellington, CA476/00. 
59 Joseph, above, 82. 
60  Joseph, above, 83. 
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Benjamin Cardozo had a comforting perspective on judicial agony.   He said that "[t]he 
work of a Judge is in one sense enduring and in another sense ephemeral". 61 
What is good in it endures.  What is erroneous is pretty sure to perish.  The good remains the 
foundation on which new structures will be built.  The bad will be rejected and cast out in the 
laboratory of the years … 
I sometimes think that we worry ourselves overmuch about the enduring consequences of our 
errors.  They may work a little confusion for a time.  In the end, they will be modified or 
corrected or their teachings ignored.  The future takes care of such things.  In the endless 
process of testing and retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross, and a constant 
retention of whatever is pure and sound and fine. 
The search for what is pure and sound and fine has exercised Sir Ivor Richardson 
throughout his judicial career.  That is appellate leadership. 
 
 
61  Benjamin Cardozo The Nature of the Judicial Process (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1921) 178-
179. 
